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Abstract: Public education in Chile has been steadily losing students as a result of the 
implementation, for the last 35 years, of a market model. In this paper we exemplify how a 
structural problem (public schools’ declining enrollment) created by neoliberal educational 
policies is transformed into an individual problem to be managed by the public school 
principal. Principals must sign a performance-based contract that specifies sanctions and 
incentives for meeting enrollment targets. The current paper examines, through data 
produced by in-depth interviews and shadowing, how 19 principals worked toward that 
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target. Findings show that to manage enrollment principals spent, on average, 24% of their 
time performing marketing tasks. Principals, thus, have developed an entrepreneurial self, 
which is promoted by quasi-market school governance models. Through this 
entrepreneurship they manage various threats that represent barriers to the possibilities for 
meeting enrollment targets. 
Keywords: Politics of education; educational policy; neoliberalism; new public 
management; school principals; professional identity. 
 
Metas, Amenazas y (des)Confianza: La Troika del Nuevo Management para 
Directores de Escuelas Públicas en Chile 
Resumen: La educación pública en Chile ha progresivamente perdido alumnos como 
resultado de la aplicación, por los últimos 35 años, de un modelo de mercado. En este 
trabajo ejemplificamos cómo un problema estructural (disminución de la matrícula en las 
escuelas públicas) creado por políticas educativas neoliberales se transforma en un 
problema individual que deber ser gestionado por el director de la escuela pública. Los 
directores deben firmar un contrato basado en el cumplimiento de metas en el cual se 
especifican las sanciones y los incentivos asociados al cumplimiento de las metas de 
matrícula. El presente estudio analiza, a través de datos producidos en entrevistas y 
shadowing, cómo 19 directores trabajan para cumplir esta meta. Los resultados muestran 
que, en promedio, los directores dedican 24 % de su tiempo a realizar tareas de marketing. 
Así, han desarrollado la identidad de emprendedor promovida por modelos de cuasi-
mercado para la gobernanza de las escuelas. A través de esta iniciativa empresarial manejan 
diversas amenazas que representan barreras a las posibilidades de alcanzar sus metas de 
matrícula. 
Palabras-clave: Políticas educativas, neoliberalismo; nueva gestión pública; directores de 
escuelas; identidad profesional. 
 
Metas, ameaças e (des)Confiança: A Troika da Nova Gestão para Diretores de 
Escolas Públicas no Chile 
Resumo: Educação pública no Chile tem vindo a perder alunos como resultado da 
implementação , nos últimos 35 anos , de um modelo de mercado . Esta pesquisa, 
exemplificam como um problema estrutural ( declínio de matrículas de escolas públicas ) 
criado por políticas educativas neoliberais é transformado em um problema individual a ser 
gerido pelo diretor da escola pública. Os diretores devem assinar um contrato baseado em 
desempenho que especifica sanções e incentivos para cumprir as metas de inscrição. O 
presente trabalho analisa , através de dados produzidos por entrevistas e shadowing, como 
19 diretores trabalharam em direção a esse alvo. Os resultados mostram que para gerenciar 
de matrículas, em média, 24 % do seu tempo se usa realizando tarefas de marketing. 
Diretores , assim , desenvolveram self empresarial promovido pela escola modelos de 
governança quase-mercado . Através deste empreendimento diretores gerido várias 
ameaças que representam barreiras para as possibilidades de cumprimento das metas de 
inscrição. 
Palavras-chave: Políticas educacionais; neoliberalismo; nova management pública; 
diretores de escolas; identidade profissional. 
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Introduction1 
Chile’s constitution guarantees educational freedom, which involves freedom for 
entrepreneurs to open and operate a school as well as parents’ freedom to choose among these 
schools. Chilean parents may “choose” to enroll their children in: (a) public2 schools managed by 
municipal governments and funded through a State, attendance-based voucher, (b) private schools 
subsidized through the same voucher, (c) private schools fully funded by families, and (d) technical-
vocational schools administered by private businesses or corporations. In1981 80% of the student 
population attended a public school (Elacqua, 2012). By 1998, public schools enrolled 55.1% of the 
students and private-subsidized schools 34.1% (Delannoy, 2000). These percentages had nearly 
reversed by 2011, with private-subsidized schools enrolling 51.8% of the students and public schools 
representing only 39.3% (Santiago, Benavides, Danielson, Goe, & Nusche, 2013).  
This enrollment trend can be explained by educational policies promoting the neoliberal 
economic and cultural/identity project that began spreading throughout the world in the 1970s 
(Connell, Fawcett, & Meagher, 2009). The growth of private school attendance has been bolstered 
by: parents’ beliefs that private schools are better than public schools; weak regulations that allow 
entrepreneurs to operate state-subsidized schools as for-profit businesses3, and policies that have 
weakened public education. In this paper we explore how a structural problem (public schools’ 
declining enrollment) created by neoliberal policies is transformed into an individual problem to be 
managed by the public school principal. Principals must sign a performance-based contract that 
specifies, among other targets, increases in student enrollment and in scores on standardized tests.  
The current paper draws data from two studies involving a total of 19 public schools 
(representing seven municipalities). All principals participated in a series of in-depth interviews and 
extensive shadowing was conducted with 13 of them. Using those data sources we analyze how they 
understood and attempted to meet enrollment targets. We explore tensions and contradictions as 
these principals are constructed and construct themselves as agents of change in pursuit of externally 
determined performance targets (Hall, 2013).  
In what follows we first outline policies that have produced the steady decline in public 
school enrollments. Next, we focus on policy for public school principals, highlighting the operation 
of workplace demands that cast them as performative workers (Ball, 2003). These policies express a 
school governance model that mixes quasi-market and evaluative state logics through regulations 
that promote: a balance of system decentralization/ centralization, external evaluation, outcomes-
based assessments, choice, autonomy with tighter control over teachers’ and school leaders’ work, 
and emphasis on extensive planning through school improvement plans (Ball, 2003; Cohen, 2014; 
Connell et al., 2009; Foster & Plowden, 1996, in Taylor, 2007; Hall, 2013; Maroy, 2004).  
Policy Context: The Production of a Steady Decline in Public Schools’ 
Enrollment 
                                                 
1 Acknowledgements: The authors thank the financial support provided, at different stages of the study, by 
FONDECYT Grant #1120922, FONDECYT Grant # 1140906, and FB 0003. Funding agencies have not had editing 
control of the contents of this article. 
2Public schools in Chile are called municipal schools because municipal governments manage them. They are fully 
funded by public money. We use public instead of municipal to avoid confusion for readers outside of Chile.  
3 About 70% of private-subsidized schools operate as for-profit business (Mizala & Torche, 2012). The issue of for-
profit subsidized schools sparked a massive student-lead protest the second semester of 2006 and in 2011 demanding 
that the government dismantle the market-based model and strengthen public education.  
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The promise of market competition and privatization of social services in general, and 
education in particular, is that citizens will receive better and more efficient professional services if 
they are positioned as consumers (Gentili, 1998; Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003). This repositioning started 
in Chile in 1981 when the military regime imposed cost-cutting, structural adjustment measures for 
the provision of educational services. The administration of public schools was transferred from the 
Ministry of Education to the municipal governments, while the Ministry kept central control of the 
K-12 curriculum and other technical inputs provided through regional offices. The transfer of 
responsibilities to municipal governments did not include public consultation, training to create local 
capacity or sufficient resources to support the provision of quality education (Delannoy, 2000). 
Alongside the processes of decentralization, a number of policies were designed to stimulate the 
participation of private providers in order to promote and affirm parents´ right and responsibility 
when choosing a school.  
Wittman’s (2008) list of the key characteristics of New Public Management (NPM) finds 
expression in educational policies promoted in Chile since the restoration of democracy in 1990 
(Montecinos, Pino, Campos, Dominguez, & Carreño, 2014). These policies aim at strengthening the 
participation of private providers, increasing external accountability, stimulating competition 
between public and private providers, institutionalizing parents/students as clients and consumers, 
and increasing decentralization and school-level autonomy to achieve centrally defined results. In the 
following sections each of these features of Chile’s educational system is briefly exemplified to 
illustrate expectations regarding principals’ new professionalism within the “classic NPM troika of 
markets, metrics and managers” (Hall, 2013, p. 269). 
Strengthening the Participation of Private Providers 
Beginning in 1993, a shared funding formula allowed private subsidized schools to charge 
tuition (co-payment), in addition to the voucher. By 2005 almost half of them charged tuition, 
increasing to 90% by 2008 (Raczynski, 2012). Each school sets the tuition value and has the 
authority to cancel enrollment if parents´ fail to pay or if students’ present behavioral or academic 
problems4.  
A clear effect of this policy has been an increase in the number of private schools as well as 
an increase in social class segregation with pupils increasingly attending schools with peers from 
their same socioeconomic group. Public education has become largely the alternative for families 
that can’t afford the tuition charged by private schools or for children and youth rejected by private 
schools that view them as a liability for climbing up the rankings produced through various 
accountability measures. Eighty percent of students in public schools come from low-income or 
middle-low socioeconomic backgrounds, with only 20% of students from these backgrounds 
attending private subsidized schools (García-Huidobro, 2010).  
Increasing Centrally Controlled Accountability 
To inform consumers’ choices, a national student-testing system (SIMCE) was introduced in 
the1980s to determine the performance, efficacy and efficiency of different schools (Maroy, 2004). 
Students are measured in grades 2nd, 4th, 6th, 8th and 10th in the areas of mathematics, language arts, 
and science, plus English in 11th grade. Additionally, samples of students are assessed in physical 
                                                 
4 The educational law of 2009 introduced greater regulation on this matter but without enforcement expulsion continued 
(OECD, 2015). 
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education and technology5. Only since 1995-96 have SIMCE results been released to the public 
(OECD, 2004). 
SIMCE is a low-stakes test for students but has high stakes for schools. Test scores have a 
significant weight in the National System for Performance Evaluation (SNED). SNED provides 
financial incentives to reward teachers in high performing subsidized schools (Delannoy, 2000; 
OECD, 2004). SIMCE scores weight 67% in the classification of schools in the Ley de Aseguramiento 
de la Calidad (Quality Assurance Law 20.529). This classification scheme is high stakes as it affords 
schools different levels of autonomy from government inspection and different levels of access to 
external technical support. The way in which SIMCE is tied to workplace conditions makes it 
difficult for teachers and principals to ignore state-mandated performance targets (Cohen, 2014). 
Carrasco’s (2013) analysis of the role of SIMCE within Chile’s educational system shows 
how SIMCE has come to create social practices that produce new subjectivities and social relations. 
For example, SIMCE6 makes selection, discrimination, and parental choice unproblematic. These are 
social practices that focus on education’s role in developing human capital but ignore its role in 
promoting human rights (Anderson, 2011). SIMCE has become more of an end in itself than tools 
for helping schools improve, and it has narrowed how the general population defines education and 
educational quality (Carrasco, 2013; Taylor, 2007). 
Stimulating Competition Among Public and Private Schools  
All private schools define admissions criteria and select students/families accordingly. Public 
schools, on the other hand, are not allowed to select or expel students (some exceptions are made 
for secondary schools). Private subsidized schools charging a co-payment are more likely to be 
selective, selecting students based on families’ ability to pay (Elacqua, 2012). Redondo et al. (2008) 
describe the process through which in the Chilean educational market, competition is among 
families (consumers) and not among schools (providers). Private schools use various selectivity 
processes to pull highest achieving students out of public schools (student creaming). Due to 
student creaming, lower tests scores are attained by public schools even when they improve their 
students’ achievement (Linkow, Streich, & Jacob, 2011).  
 In Chile, the majority of the population believes that private schools provide students with a 
better education (Elacqua, Martínez, & Aninat, 2010). This perception could be based on highly 
publicized results from SIMCE and international testing programs (i.e. PISA), which show that, on 
average, public schools perform below private schools. Of course, media outlets do not explain how 
social segregation explains a large portion of this difference (Elacqua, 2012) nor problematize the 
limited definition of quality education entailed in SIMCE. A number of studies have shown that 
achievement differences between private subsidized and public schools on SIMCE are minimal or 
null after controlling for students’ socioeconomic background (Mizala & Romaguera, 1998). 
Institutionalizing Families and Students as Clients of Educational Providers 
Gentili (1998) states that by transferring education from the political to the market sphere, 
education is no longer understood as a social right. Instead it becomes a commodity that can be 
purchased by consumers according to the capital that they have available (financial, social, symbolic, 
etc.). Choice in Chile has created a notoriously well-known inequitable educational system (OECD, 
                                                 
5 Recently, the government announced (March 30, 2015) the will to revise this national assessment plan. In the short 
term some tests have been eliminated for the 2015 academic year. 
6 The “Alto al SIMCE” (Stop SIMCE) campaign is a social movement promoting broader changes so education is 
enacted as a social right rather than a commodity. Its key platform is to stop testing as a market tool and develop an 
alternative national evaluation system. 
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2015). Studies have shown that among Chilean families school choices are based on factors other 
than SIMCE scores (Chumacero, Gomez Caorsi, & Paredes, 2008). Parents from different 
socioeconomic groups differ in the elements they consider when choosing a school (Ball, Bowe, & 
Gerwitz, 1995). Low-income parents in Chile prioritize safety concerns and practicalities such as 
distance from work/home (Montecinos, Sisto & Ahumada, 2010; Taut et al., 2009). Schneider, 
Elacqua and Buckley (2006) found that choice among middle and upper socio-economic groups was 
influenced by the social class composition of the student body. Choice is dependent upon to the 
information available to parents and low-income parents cannot always access needed information 
(Rojas, 2009).  
From a “supply” perspective, choice has prompted schools to implement a number of 
strategies to boost enrollment. Weinstein and colleagues (2012) identified five strategies used by 
Chilean principals working in public and private subsidized elementary schools located in low 
income communities: open a preschool program; strengthen and differentiate the school´s identity 
by attaching it to the locality or raising the status of families enrolling children at that school; 
increase the school’s reputation by offering a wider range of non-academic services to show 
commitment to quality education; and publicize SIMCE scores. In the current study we restrict the 
sample to public schools, with all but two, classified as low performing and thus unable to use 
several of the strategies reported by Weinstein and colleagues (2012).  
In the United States studies by Linkow and colleagues (2011) and Cohen (2014) have 
reported the use of similar strategies. Schools may provide additional services, such before- and 
after-school programs and access to comprehensive “wraparound” services from other local social 
and health services organizations. Cohen’s (2014) study showed how market forces worked to 
pressure principals to engage in public relations to promote the school and manage the school’s 
image. These practices hardly address the quality of the educational program provided by the school 
as they rely on marketing, rather than educational logics.  
With the creation of Superintendecia de Educación (School Superintendence7), in 2012, Chilean 
parents who feel that their rights or their student´s rights have been violated by some action of the 
school can file a complaint that this office must investigate to ensure schools meet legal standards 
for operation. Biesta (2004) notes that through accountability agencies, such as the Superintendence, 
“the relationship between the state and its citizens is no longer a substantial relationship but has 
turned into a strictly formal relationship.” (p. 238). This Superintendence reinforces the notion that 
problems between schools and parents are to be resolved through consumer forms of 
accountability, rather than through democratic forms of accountability. Following Ryan (2005), 
democratic accountability provides information to orient conversations among members of the 
school and the communities served by the school about values and interests that inform decisions 
regarding issues such as what to do, for what purposes, and how to improve education and student 
learning.  
The policies we have discussed above show that in Chile public education is by design weak. 
To strengthen public education a new generation of policies has been developed based on a key 
assumption of the market model, the need for entrepreneurial autonomy. These policies purport to 
afford school administrators needed autonomy to manage the financial and pedagogical resources in 
order for the school to stay competitive. Autonomy allows principals to respond with greater 
efficiency and effectiveness to requests made either by educational authorities or by 
students/parents (Maroy, 2004; Weinstein, Muñoz, & Marfán, 2012). Gary Anderson (personal 
                                                 
7 The Superintendence is an independent  office charged with auditing school providers to ensure strict 
adherence to the laws and regulations as well as auditing the lawful use of State funds (vouchers).  
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communication, March, 2015) notes that in the United States autonomy is undermined when 
performance targets defined outside the school walls drive classroom teaching. 
Decentralization/autonomy for the School Principal 
It is in 2005 when educational policymakers in Chile began to explicitly address the school 
principalship within the neoliberal framework for educational reform (Núñez, Weinstein, & Muñoz, 
2010). The School Leadership Framework (Marco para la Buena Dirección) was developed in 2005, 
codifying the set of competencies needed to successfully lead a school. These competencies are 
organized into four dimensions: leadership, curricular management, management of the school 
climate, and resource management. Concurrently, a law defining the procedures for hiring, firing and 
evaluating a school principal was approved (Ley de Concursabilidad de Directores, Nº 20.006). This law 
was important at the time as it standardized and formalized the selection processes to prevent 
arbitrariness, such as a municipal mayor’s office appointing political allies. 
In 2011 the Ley de Calidad y Equidad de la Educación (LQE) stipulated new regulations for 
hiring public school principals through a competitive process; with the final decision placed in the 
hands of the city’s mayor. To strengthen school leadership, among other things, this law specifies 
salary increases, performance-based bonuses, and the provision of competitive grants for enrollment 
in professional development courses. It also includes provisions for greater autonomy over staffing 
and budget matters. For example, each year a principal can fire up to 5% of teachers identified, 
through the national teacher assessment system, as underperforming. A new principal can bring with 
him or her two key members of the leadership team: (a) the director of the technical-pedagogical 
unit who acts as curriculum coordinator and (b) the general inspector who is typically responsible 
for monitoring and sanctioning students’ behavior.  
Municipal governments were provided new tools to define principal–employer relations to 
enable control of work priorities and processes (Evetts, 2011). Principals are required to sign a 5-
year contract and are directly responsible for the attainment of the predefined results specified in 
this contract. To achieve these results, the law states that principals need to focus on instructional 
leadership responsibilities, in addition to administrative tasks. Exhibit 1 presents a typical job 
advertisement, specifying the results to be achieved by the principal. Meeting the goals may lead to 
obtaining a financial bonus to termination of contract.  
The principal’s performance agreement contract promises to improve school’s productivity 
through planning, implementation, and monitoring of various school processes and outcomes 
(Maxcy, 2009). The plan that principals must manage is framed by the Preferential Subsidy Law 
(SEP) introduced in 2008 to address inequity through a funding formula associated with the 
proportion of low-income students (priority students) enrolled in a subsidized school. By adding an 
extra per-pupil subsidy for each priority student (50 percent over the base voucher), SEP law 
recognizes that it is more costly to educate students growing up in a situation of social vulnerability 
(Valenzuela, Villarroel, & Villalobos, 2013). To become eligible for SEP monies participating 
schools cannot select priority students or charge parents a co-payment.  
School improvement plans required by the SEP Law. Based on an institutional self-
assessment, the school develops an improvement plan. This plan is a contract, Agreement of Equal 
Opportunities and Educational Excellence, the school’s owner signs with the Ministry of Education. By 
2009, 99.9% of public schools had signed their performance agreement with the Ministry to receive 
SEP funding. Although SEP is touted as a tool for decentralization, the Ministry predefines the 
outcomes to be achieved by the improvement plan (SIMCE scores) with little room to address 
school-specific aspects emerging from the institutional self-assessment (Weinstein, Fuenzalida, & 
Muñoz, 2010). Principals are explicitly required to focus their efforts on instructional leadership (i.e., 
setting high expectations, planning the instructional program, and conducting classroom  
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Exhibit 1  
     Selected Goals and Indicators for a Performance Agreement Contract Signed by a Newly Hired School Principal 
 
Objectives Indicators Formula Strategic Annual Goals Evidence 
Consequences for 
meeting/not 
meeting the goals 
1. Improve results 
on assessments of 
students’ learning 
     
Average yearly 
4th grade 
SIMCE score  
Average yearly score in 
language and 
mathematics  
Current score: 231 SIMCE score 
published in 
[webpage] 
From a reprimand to 
termination of 
contract / certificate 
of goal achievement  
Year 1: Improve 5 points relative 
to the previous year  
Year 2: Improve 10 points relative 
to the previous year 
Years 3, 4, and 5: Each year, 
improve 5 points relative to the 
previous year 
     
Average yearly 
8th grade 
SIMCE score 
Average score in 
language and 
mathematics each year 
Current score: 246 Same as above Same as above 
Same as above 
2. Improve  
enrollment and  
daily attendance 
     
Number of 
Students 
enrolled in April  
(Number of Students 
enrolled in April of the 
current year) – 
(Number of enrolled in 
April of the previous 
year) 
Current enrollment: 1200 Number of 
students enrolled 
in database SIGE- 
- SINEDUC 
Same as above 
Years 1, 2, and 3: Each year, 
maintain enrollment of the 
previous year 
Years 4 and 5: Each year, increase 
in 5 students the enrollment of the 
previous year  
Source: Adapted from http://www.directoresparachile 
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observations to assess and develop teaching capacities). The Superintendence of Education monitors 
the implementation of SEP’s legal requirements, sanctioning schools if these are not met. 
Based on trends in SIMCE scores, and other indicators, schools are classified to determine 
how much monitoring/intervention they will receive from the Ministry of Education, with higher 
performing schools given greater autonomy to design and implement an improvement plan (see 
Table 2 for a description of this classification scheme). The reliance on external experts in the 
oversight of a school’s improvement plan shifts trust in teachers’ capacity and commitment to their 
students to those who audit teachers` work (Taylor, 2007). 
 Ahumada’s (2010) findings show that there is insufficient articulation among these various 
sets of laws and the intended improvement of equity and quality has not been achieved. This 
articulation, however, is expected to emerge as a result of fractal organizational logics by which each 
school is a microcosm of the district (Connell, Fawcett,  and Meagher, 2009). Such logic for school 
governance underpins laws such as SEP and LQE as each individual’s role (entrepreneurship) 
replicates the role of the larger unit in which she or he is embedded: 
“… each part of an organization functions like a profit-making firm, with its 
managers held accountable for the income/expenditure balance. … Individual 
workers are treated as firms, expected to follow a profit-making logic; and are held 
accountable to the organization in these terms, through ‘performance management’ 
schemes. (Connell et al., 2009, p. 334) 
In a weakened public educational system this fractal logic is highly problematic as it makes individual 
teachers and school leaders responsible for overcoming the financial crisis faced by many 
municipalities in Chile (Hsieh & Urquiola, 2003; Islas & Mardones, 2007). Declining enrollments 
have exacerbated the historical underfunding of public schools as funding is based on attendance. A 
survey conducted in 2007 with directors of municipal Departments of Education showed 45% 
indicated that their main priority was enrollment and attendance (Raczynski, 2012)- a concern that 
can be directly linked to the financial crisis. In order to increase enrollment, the fractal logic pushes 
public schools within a municipality to compete against each other.  
In the current study we examine how 19 public school principals respond to their employer`s 
demands that they attract and retain students in the uneven playing field that has been generated by 
the marketization of education. The market model in which they must manage their school is 
expected to influence how they have come to understand themselves as professionals, their work 
priorities, and their relationships with employers as well as with parents/students (Ball, 2003; 2010).  
Method 
Overview of the Research Designs and Questions 
Study 1. This 3-year longitudinal multiple case study focused on leadership practices during 
the process of elaborating and implementing school improvement plans within a SEP contract. The 
study involves six schools and examines practices in the areas of curriculum, school climate, and 
resources management and their impact on students’ learning and on organizational learning.  
Study 2. This is an ongoing 3-year longitudinal multiple case study focused on how 13 
novice principals learn to become the instructional leaders expected by SEP and the LQE laws. For 
the current paper we draw data from the first year of data production. 
Table 1 summarizes school level data showing that these 19 public schools are experiencing 
declining or fluctuating enrollments and low performance on SIMCE. A preliminary analysis of data 
produced in both studies showed that although SEP and LQE laws explicitly require principals to 
prioritize instructional leadership and participants shared this expectation; a large chunk of their time  
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Table 1  
     Characteristics of the Schools Lead by Participating Principals  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Schools ID 1-13 participated in Study 1; schools ID 14-19 participated in Study 2. 
Source: Ministry of Education Center for Study. To protect anonymity, data reported as range. IVE indicates the proportion of priority students. SEP 
school classification: Autonomous schools consistently demonstrated high achievement on measurements administered by the Ministry of Education; 
Emergent schools had average or below average performance, too few students to draw inferences, or operated two years or less; Recuperation schools 
consistently had poor performance or had not submitted an improvement plan in the timeframe required. 
School 
ID* Educational Level Location IVE 
SEP 
Classification 
Enrollment 
2014 
Enrollment 
Percent 
Change 2010-
2014 
Trend 
SIMCE 
Mathematic 
Score 
Position on SIMCE 
relative to schools serving 
students from same SES 
1 Elementary Rural 75% Emergent 230-340 35% Fluctuating Below 
2 Comprehensive 8-12 Urban 83, 61% Emergent 330-340 -46% 
Steady 
Increase 
Below 
3 Elementary Rural 88% Emergent 150-160 -7% Fluctuating Below 
4 High School Urban 79% Emergent 760-770 -4% Steady decrease 
Similar 
5 High School Urban 68% Emergent 1330-1400 -38% Increase Above 
6 Comprehensive K-12 Urban 72, 89% Emergent 600-610 -47% 
Steady 
decrease 
Below 
7 Elementary Urban 89% Recuperation 170-180 -10% Increase Below 
8 Elementary Rural 88% Emergent 180-190 37% Fluctuating Below 
9 Elementary Urban 55% Emergent 330-340 -32% Fluctuating Below 
10 Elementary Urban 76% Emergent 130-140 -1% Fluctuating Below 
11 Elementary Urban 72% Emergent 250-260 -28% Fluctuating Below 
12 Elementary Urban 66% Emergent 170-180 -24% Fluctuating Below 
13 Elementary Urban 87% Emergent 140-150 -10% Decline Below 
14 Elementary Rural 86% Emergent 50-60 19% Fluctuating Above 
15 Elementary Rural 72% Emergent 50-60 24% Steady Increase Below 
16 Elementary Rural 64% Emergent 60-70 40% Increase Above 
17 Elementary Urban 51% Autonomous 250-260 -5% Fluctuating Similar 
18 Elementary Urban 84% Autonomous 180-190 -6% Fluctuating Below 
 was devoted to managing enrollment. This finding is examined in the current manuscript 
through the following guiding research questions: 
1. How do public school principals understand the causes for the enrollment trend in their 
schools?  
2. What do principals do, and why, to meet the enrollment goals defined in their contracts?  
Participants 
Study 1. Three urban and three rural schools that had just entered SEP were invited to be part 
of the study. In each school the principal, other members of the leadership team, teachers, parents, 
and students participated in the data production process. For the current paper only data produced 
with principals (four women and two men) have been analyzed. After explaining to them their rights 
and involvement over the duration of the study, all participants signed an Informed Consent. 
Study 2. The national database for job advertisements for principal posts was examined during 
the last semester of 2013 and the first semester of 2014 to identify public schools within a region in 
Chile that hired a new principal. The Director of Education for each school identified was then 
contacted to learn if the candidate selected was a first-time principal and to request they invite all of 
their novice principals to be part of the study. Among the 14 principals referred by the Directors and 
contacted by the research team, 13 (11 women) signed an Informed Consent agreeing to participate in 
the study.  
Data Sources and Procedures 
Study 1. Each year a semi-structured in-depth interview was conducted with each of the six 
principals. In the first interview their leadership practices in the three areas of management were 
explored and in the second interview principals were asked to explain the context for implementing 
these practices. In the third interview principals were asked to identify and analyze factors that 
facilitated or made difficult the implementation of these practices. For the current paper we analyzed 
data from 18 in-depth interviews (36 hours of audio recording). 
Study 2. Data production involved in-depth interviews and work shadowing. A total of three 
in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with each principal: two within two to sixth 
months since they had started their appointment and one at the end of the academic year. The first 
interview focused on recruitment into the study, the selection process they had undergone, and their 
professional biography. In the second interview we asked about their initial assessment of the 
conditions at the school, the goals they expected to accomplish and the practices they wanted to 
implement to achieve those goals. In the third interview, principals were asked to reflect on the 
highlights of their first year as a school principal and what they had learned. A statistical summary of 
the activities recorded via shadowing was shared with participants asking them to reflect on the data. 
For the current paper we analyzed 39 in-depth interviews (65 hours of audio recording).  
Work shadowing entailed a total of 25 days, as 12 of the 13 principals in Study 2 were 
observed for two days each, about 9 hours daily (McDonald, 2005). A researcher came to the school 
either with or before the arrival of the principal and left the school when the workday ended. These 
days were decided by the principal, with a request by the researcher to include a day in which he or she 
held a faculty meeting. During this time the researcher observed every activity in which the principal 
participated, except when the principal requested privacy. The researcher recorded, in writing, 
descriptive and reflective field notes about what was observed as well as comments made by the 
principal to the researcher. For every action, a starting and ending time were recorded as well as all the 
people involved.  
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Data Analysis 
Shadowing. Field notes of the actions observed were entered into an Excel spread sheet. 
Actions were grouped into activities (e.g. action: present SIMCE data; Activity: faculty meeting). Two 
researchers independently labeled activities and actions. Following a discussion to agree on the labels 
that best represented the meaning of the activities and the actions, the same two researchers 
independently coded all actions. A third researcher audited this last set of coding. 
Interviews. After the shadowing data were analyzed, two researchers independently read 
interview transcripts highlighting segments that made references to activities and actions associated 
with enrollment. The whole research team discussed identified segments to determine their relevance 
to enrollment issues as well as their relevance to the new professionalism promoted by performative 
cultures. Finally, a textual corpus was developed that illustrated principal’s actions and rationale as they 
managed their school’s enrollment.8 
Results 
Findings show that the performance agreement, with the sanctions it entailed, was at the 
forefront of principals’ minds as they explained their sense of limited autonomy to manage resources 
and priorities. In varying degrees we observed principals engaging in five marketing strategies to 
attract and retain parents. The diversity and nature of the strategies, as well as principals’ perspectives, 
provide evidence for Ball’s (2003) findings with regard to how new forms of entrepreneurial control 
act on educational professionals’ subjectivities. Principals are hired to become their schools’ 
instructional leaders, but as they become aware of the need to compete for students, they remove 
themselves from this instructional role and move closer to the role of fundraisers and marketing 
directors. The principal becomes the agent of the municipality’s priorities to increase enrollment thus 
ensuring the needed funding that comes with attendance.  
Principals’ Limited Autonomy  
Participating principals were strong advocates for public education and expressed a genuine 
interest in lifting public schools from their current situation. As we walked though one of the 
participating high schools, we noticed many empty classrooms as this school was built for about 2000 
students but at the time enrollment was slightly less than 1200. The lack of funding that came with low 
enrollment generated problems for keeping up the school infrastructure, as evidenced in athletics 
facilities in dire need of repairs. Although municipal governments had not defined a minimum 
enrollment, principals in smaller schools lived under the constant threat of a possible school closure:  
When I took the post, we only had 160 [students] enrolled and last year [the school] had 400, 
then declined to 320, then it got super serious, serious, serious. (Principal School 2, p. 5). 
 
When there are too few students the money that comes through the subsidy cannot cover the 
school’s operating expenses. That worries our bosses… from their perspective it is best to 
close the school and transfer students to another school; it will be cheaper to bus them. But… 
for the community a school closure is a loss. (Principal School 15, p. 10)  
In contradiction to provisions in the LQE law allowing principals greater autonomy over resources 
and pedagogical decisions, our participants reported working under important constraints and 
                                                 
8 Interviews were conducted in Spanish. Excerpts from interview transcripts have been translated from Spanish 
to English. The translation involved some editing for clarity. In the excerpts we use ellipses for omitted words 
and brackets for additional information.  
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conflicting messages. Staffing was a critical problem for principals and teachers because end-of-year 
enrollment could dramatically change the teaching positions available for the following year. The lack 
of funding for severance pay precluded the possibility of terminating positions and teachers were 
moved around from one school to another independent of a principal’s staffing needs (or teacher’s 
interests). SEP funding was administered centrally, thus the efficiency promised through increased 
individual accountability did not materialize: 
Because we have a high enrollment, the Department of Education sends us all of the teachers 
who have been displaced from the other schools. We have to learn to deal with this. (Principal 
School 13, p. 117) 
 
I needed to solve a problem in the school [find a substitute teacher] and I believed that I had 
the autonomy to do it. I do not have much autonomy so on that matter I was mistaken. I have 
to send the request to the [Department of Education] and then they have to make all the 
arrangements. That takes a long time […] parents could claim that no one is in charge of the 
students. Moreover, if the superintendence showed up we could face an important fine. 
(Principal School 8, p. 573) 
Overall, we found few examples of principals’ engagement in an overt critical analysis of the policy 
context that had placed public schools in a precarious situation. A lack of contestation by the majority 
of the participants could be associated with a principal selection process that homogenizes a school 
leadership force aligned with the policies they are required to implement. More often we hear 
criticisms of the municipal Department of Education, such as the one exemplified in the previous 
interview excerpt. These related to tension between the principal priorities and the central office and 
to overt threats to school professionals engaging in active resistance:  
Interviewer: During the days I observed you at work, you spent quite a bit of time planning a 
promotional activity. How important is this activity for you?  
Principal: To tell you the truth, not at all […] I did it because the system makes me do that 
[…] for me the enrollment issue is difficult because we are confronting a national, systemic 
problem. I feel that too much of my time, and many things that I should be leading, get lost 
because of [trying to increase enrollment] […]. I think that if we focused on instruction, if we 
achieve good results, people will come, we will increase. However, when I am directly 
threatened, “We will fire you if you do not reach the goal”, I have to get moving. Personally, it 
is very taxing. (Principal School 5, p. 14) 
Efforts by Chilean teachers and students to resist the marketization of education are a double edge 
sword for public schools. The long public school students’ strike of 2011 contributed to lowering 
enrollments as well as to some policy adjustments to soften marketization. In one of the participating 
high schools, 600 students left during the strike to join private subsidized schools and never returned. 
The following quote from a principal provides a sense of the straightforward ways in which markets, 
metrics, and managers (Hall, 2013) jointly work to create a backlash to resistance:  
Teachers were calling to boycott SIMCE. I spoke with teachers and said to them: “Ok… we 
must be very aware that we will lose SNED [the financial incentive given to high performing 
school]. I will join the call and my leadership team will join too, but let us not cry later when 
we do not get SNED” […] “I believe that there are ways to defend public education, but we 
will hurt our students” […]. Later we had to vote on a teacher strike and we voted NO […]. I 
went to every 10th grade class explaining SIMCE and why we had not joined the strike, why 
we were in favor of the social demands but why we felt [not administering SIMCE and going 
on strike] would hurt students. The day SIMCE was administered we had a 96% attendance 
among 10th graders. (Principal School 5, p. 22) 
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Marketing Practices 
Principals in our study dedicated a considerable amount of their time to marketing their 
schools. Of the 228 hours of principal observations, we found that 52 hours (24% of the total) were 
spent on activities directly or indirectly linked to attracting and retaining students (see Table 2). There 
is great diversity among schools, from the principal in a comprehensive K-12 vocational school 
spending as much as 85% of his time during those two days of shadowing on activities related 
enrollment, to three principals devoting 5% of their time to this issue. In terms of the number of 
actions enacted to increase enrollment these represented 28% (n=198) of a total of 840 actions 
recorded (average of 32 actions each day, per principal). The number of actions associated with 
managing enrollment ranged from 38 to 3.  
 Table 2 summarizes five different types of activities implemented by principals to manage 
enrollment: redesign of the institutional image, analysis of enrollment and attendance data, networking 
with external organizations, establishing relationships with parents, and participating in events in the 
wider community. During the interviews, principals spoke at length about three of these marketing 
practices: redesigning the institutional image to compete against more attractive schools, networking 
with external organization to enrich the school offerings, and catering to parents’ concerns. 
 
Table 2  
     Enrollment Management Practices Observed through Work Shadowing of Principals (n=13) 
Activities Frequency of 
Actions 
Number  
of hours 
Examples of Actions 
    
Redesign of the 
institutional 
image  
4 1 New uniform for students 
New school logo 
Changing the school colors 
Brainstorming ideas to attract more students  
Analysis of 
enrollment and 
attendance 
7 1 Analyzing data during a faculty meeting  
 
Networks with 
external 
organizations to 
increase 
resources 
34 8 Sign agreements with the local public health service 
Sign agreements with universities 
Obtain sponsorships from businesses  
 
Relationships 
with parents 
58 18 Provide students with a bus for home- school 
transportation  
Meet with parents who are inquiring about admissions 
Meet with parents who have a complaint regarding a 
teacher 
Design and implement after school activities for parents 
and students 
Promotion of the 
school in 
community 
events 
86 23 Attend and host various community events organized by 
the local or national governments 
Purchase publicity materials (posters, banners, leaflets, etc.) 
Participate in promotional events 
 
Developing a new image to compete against more attractive schools. The school 
leadership teams and faculty met to analyze enrollment data and discuss alternative strategies to recruit 
Targets, Threats and (dis)Trust   15 
 
students. In these meetings we observed how principals stressed the importance of offering a quality 
education but this was not enough; the school needed to promote itself. For example, in one high 
school a faculty meeting was devoted to preparing a promotional activity that would take place in one 
of the local parks, with teachers organized into teams responsible for hosting different booths. 
Meanwhile, the principal worked with the municipality’s Department of Education to get funding to 
rent amplification equipment and purchase a school banner. This example suggests that improving 
enrollment is understood as a school wide obligation and not only a problem for the principal to solve. 
Sanctions and bonuses associated with meeting targets, however, only impact principals.  
A key marketing strategy entails transforming the school’s institutional image and identity. This 
strategy addresses a concern with reputation and image that market forces have created for public and 
private schools in Chile. For example, some of the participating schools were busy changing their 
colors and students’ uniform, others were creating a new logo and slogans, as well as improving the 
aesthetics of the building by painting or planting flowers and trees. In some schools marketing 
involved hiring an advertisement agency and during faculty meetings teachers evaluated consultant’s 
proposals for an image that could be more appealing to the families. The effectiveness of these types 
of activities is an empirical question as in Chile we observe a decoupling of success in school`s 
enrollment from success in SIMCE outcomes (MacLeod and Urquiola (2009). 
Observational data showed principals spend quite a bit of time working to attract new students 
and retain current students. Attracting students depends on the principal’s ability to promote the 
school, to manage and present it in a positive light, and to bring back the historical reputation of 
public education in general and of their school in particular. In the next excerpts we exemplify how 
some of our participants understood the limitations of marketing as it diverted attention away from 
academics and from students’ needs: 
Interviewer: During the previous interview you mentioned enrollment […] 
Principal: has decreased  
Interviewer: Have you engaged in specific activities to raise enrollment? 
Principal: Well, we have done marketing, through media outlets, through the radio 
[…] but there is a larger damage that cannot be undone in a year… This [vocational-
technical] high school is not what it used to be in terms of its academic excellence, of 
its high standards […]. It used to be the case that for the 200 openings in [9th grade] 
we had 800 applicants. […] now we have 200 applicants. (Principal School 4, p. 37) 
In this school SIMCE is not a priority. First, we need to help our students’ 
understand the importance of learning, of how it will help them in life […]. Here 
students write down their name on the test and get tired. It is important we 
understand the context of each of our students (Principal School 2, p. 9) 
For the market model to work, its ideology must penetrate the subjectivities of parents and students, 
stimulating the imagination of aspirational consumers. The private sector attracts families who see in 
their school choice an improvement in their position in the class relations in their neighborhood 
(identity differentiation). Public schools have become stigmatized, thus creating a new school image is 
needed to change its reputation. 
I understand that it is a competition problem, because there are children who could 
be [attending] this school but are in a subsidized private school. I believe that the 
system [educational] has dismissed the public school by labeling us poor. Obviously, 
nobody wants to be poor. In these villages, parents believe that [if] “I'm in a private 
school, I will not look bad, I will not look poor”. People like to compare, like 
competition; that is the main cause for our loss of so much funding. (Principal 
School 3, p. 89) 
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Subsidized private schools sell more on image rather than on results. The other day I 
asked a group of parents, "What do you look for when choosing a school?" A parent 
answered, "Well, I see if the school is pretty". I asked “What else”? Another parent 
said: "If the children look orderly, if the school staff treats us well when we come". 
None, none said if the school has good results. So that is why we have made this 
change in our uniform, some people criticize us, but this will have an impact 
(Principal School 9, p. 393). 
A perception of competing against a more attractive rival fueled the implementation of different 
strategies to make the public school mimic the image sold by private providers. Assimilating the 
trappings of the product offered by private schools would appeal to parents and students as 
consumers. Principals could draw from concrete anecdotes that reified the consumer subjectivities 
through which schools and parents had come to frame their relationships. Within this logic, a clear 
risk of instrumentalizing students’ as assets in the school’s balance sheet emerges: 
That is why I tell you that these changes are important. For instance, the other day a 
mother was withdrawing her son from this school, but when the child saw the new 
uniform, he chose to stay. These types of changes have worked. We have had more 
students enrolled. Last year we had a total 44 students and this year we are now at 
53. For a school like this one, each student is very valuable (Principal School 14, p. 
2). 
Networking with external organization. Networking attempts to achieve two main, interrelated 
goals: access to more resources and improving the ‘attractiveness’ of the school through an expansion 
of its social capital. Businesses, on the other hand, are interested in contributing money or products as 
a marketing strategy linked to corporate social responsibility as well as tax breaks for philanthropy. 
Developing partnerships contributes to boosting-up the ‘commercial image’ of the school, giving it an 
advantage over other schools in pulling in and retaining parents. A principal’s ability to secure a 
partnership shows his or her employer the principal´s entrepreneurial skills needed to move the school 
forward: 
When [the retail store] selected this school, people from the Department of 
Education came and congratulated me for my abilities. They knew that many other 
schools in the city had failed to obtain this partnership […]. At the end of each year 
this store gives awards to the top graduating 8th graders (Principal School 17, p. 28). 
Partnerships are identified as critical for the success of the school and a declaration of 
acceptance of the principal’s ultimate responsibility for making the school succeed. The 
paradox of centralization and autonomy could be solved, according to one of our 
participants, by developing an entrepreneurial self that would provide more efficient 
solutions: 
That experience [a previous problem with the Department of Education] allowed me 
to strengthen myself, to understand that it is my responsibility alone to run this 
institution. I cannot count on support from the municipality. I am something in 
between an entrepreneur who generates his own resources and the one responsible 
for the goals they set for me (Principal School 6, p. 25).  
It is unclear if the market or tradition has entailed networking as part of the principal’s role to ensure 
adequate transitioning from high school to the labor market or postsecondary education. We observed 
secondary principals in vocational-technical schools investing time developing connections with 
industries to find practicum placement /employment for their graduates (how many students, and 
where, are employed is a key selling point for this type of school). The principal in a college-bound 
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high school spent several hours networking with university presidents and vice-presidents, seeking 
agreements that would allow fast tracking students’ entrance to the university. This would boost a 
competitive advantage as, traditionally, public school students attain low college entrance examination 
scores thus few enter the public universities that provide government financial aid.  
Catering to parents’ concerns. Through the interviews, principals portrayed parents as 
protagonists for the school’s survival. Parents’ power resides in their choice to withdraw students from 
the school at any time and principal’s imperative to retain them. In the next quotes we observe how 
principals validate parental choice as a strategy to mobilize school improvement, but this strategy fails 
to address changes that impact the quality of the learning experiences the school creates for students. 
If a parent came and said, "Hey, I'm going to leave [the school] because the school is 
bad", it would be terrible. So we have to keep working on that, keep the population 
here, the enrollment and make it a stable enrollment […]. This year I have 182 
students and I will start 2015 with 182 […]. Our task now is to let everybody know 
all the things that we are doing in the school. (Principal School 8, p. 157) 
 
For many years the school was stagnant [in terms of enrollment]. Parents’ petitions 
were not addressed […] they wanted new uniforms, we gave them new uniforms; 
they wanted the school painted, now the school is painted; they wanted better 
treatment from the staff, now the treatment is different. (Principal School 12, p. 201) 
Teacher-student conflicts are the biggest internal threats to student retention. Principals are concerned 
with students’ well being but they also keep in mind that unhappy parents will withdraw their pupils. 
We observed how principals worked at repairing or building relationships with families and students. 
Parents have established a strong control over teacher’s work, monitoring their activities closely, with 
a continuous overt threat of moving the students to another school: 
It was 8:15 and she [the teacher] was not in the classroom and we start classes at 
8:10. These parents were looking and aware she was late. So, I went to her classroom 
and asked the students about her, they told me “the teacher is not around”. So I 
started the class myself, concerned about what parents may say […]. We could 
receive a fine from the Superintendence […]. Later, I had to reprehend that teacher 
(Principal School 8, p. 392). 
The excerpt exemplifies that parents are holding professionals more accountable. While this may 
benefit children, it also runs the risk of eroding professional autonomy when accountability works 
from a logic of distrust (as opposed to accounting to others the extent to which one delivered what 
one promised). Parents’ empowerment is one of the dilemmas of the new professionalism, placing the 
principal in a difficult position. Our participants found themselves between parents’ control and 
teachers’ concerns with maintaining their authority and autonomy. 
In an effort to give parents/students reasons to choose their school, principals added services 
such as free transportation to and from school and offered recreational activities for students and 
parents. Students were provided with additional co-curricular activities, such a cheerleading squad and 
a dance group that performed in activities organized by the municipal government, thus making the 
“new” school visible. These kinds of activities involve expenditures that may report educational 
benefits to participants, but are limited to few, selected students. 
Parents, positioning themselves as consumers, would either go or threaten to go to the 
Education Superintendence office to file a formal complaint, which then required principals to spend 
time responding to the complaint by conducting internal investigations. In one of the schools, in 
which teachers were in overt conflict with the new principal, the same parent had filed 9 complaints 
with the Superintendence. In another school, on one of the days we shadowed the principal, she came 
in at 10 am (entry time is 8 am) because she had been giving an affidavit for an investigation due to a 
Education Policy Analysis Archives  Vol. 23 No. 87  New Public Management & New Professionalism 18 
 
parent’s complaint of a teacher’s alleged mistreatment of a student. Her report, the principal told the 
researcher, expressed her own concerns about this teacher’s relationship with students. These practices 
exemplify the erosion of trust other authors have described as a consequences of the adoption of 
managerialism in the public service sector (Maxcy, 2009). They also exemplify a dilemma within a 
critique of new professionalism, as one must reflect on the appropriate balance between an 
empowered parent/student and professional autonomy. Making sure teachers arrive on time to class is 
important but one must wonder why not all teachers at that school had adopted that practice? 
Discussion 
Although participating principals understood the complexity of issues that had caused families’ 
flight from public schools, they also accepted personal responsibility for addressing this situation in 
their schools. Through the rigorous selection process, we hypothesize that candidates who have 
already adopted managerial subjectivities apply and are later hired, further reifying the school 
governance model advanced by NPM. In our observations as well as in principals’ accounts of how 
enrollment targets played out in their daily work we observe the enactment of the “new 
professionalism” advocated by NPM. Following Evetts (2011), in the pursuit of enrollment targets the 
self-interest of the municipal government (employer) appeared to prevail over principals’ interest in 
the academic program required to lift public education and families’ interest in a quality education for 
their children. This shift in priorities exemplifies why and how education understood as a commodity 
undermines the ideal of education as a social right. Heeding the priorities of the municipality creates 
tensions among participating principals when they believe that the solution to enrollment declines is 
long-term and involves more attention to real improvements in educational opportunities than to 
marketing. This exemplifies what Evetts (2011) discusses as the unintended consequences, distraction 
from the professional´s core mission, of the imposition of targets by a managerialist version of 
professionalism.  
 The performance agreement used by educational law in Chile to judge the quality of principals 
exemplifies the technology of performativity through which complex social processes, such an 
inequitable educational system and choice in our case, are translated into a regime of numbers to hold 
individuals accountable (Ball, 2003). The enrollment performance target effectively served to control 
principals’ work. What is striking in the data presented in this paper is how principals’ enrollment 
efforts must be geared toward managing threats they receive from various stakeholders. The municipal 
Department of Education threatens to fire the principal and threatens school closure if enrollment 
targets are not attained. Parents dissatisfied with the school threaten principals with withdrawing their 
pupil or with filing a complaint with the Superintendence. The State, via the Superintendence of 
Education, threatens the school with fines if the it violates a legal provision. Targets, to the extent that 
they are linked to external rewards, threaten the possibility of teachers’ resistance as financial benefits 
and autonomy are jeopardized. In the midst of these threat-based relations the principal is expected to 
overcome the legacy of over 30 years of educational policies designed to weaken the public school he 
or she has agreed to lead. 
Principals, some willingly and some reluctantly, became entrepreneurs seeking to attract 
resources (students who bring the voucher and partnerships) in what they described as a competitive 
school marketplace. Marketing was the key approach principals deployed to meet their employer’s 
requirement (and need) for increased enrollment. Through marketing they sought to convince parents 
that under the principal´s leadership the school had change and it was now amenable to serving 
parents’ desires. Marketing involved attempts to model the public school after the services provided 
by the private schools, thus catering to the interests of consumers (parents).  
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The efficiency and effectiveness of marketing strategies to boost enrollment in low 
performing, stigmatized public schools are dubious and place principals and their schools as active 
contributors to sustaining the very system that has undermined public education. As the marketing 
strategies of private providers are better funded, as they are asked to compete on an unequal level 
field, as public schools have become stigmatized, meeting goals (SIMCE and enrollment) is not 
enough to turn the wave eroding citizens’ trust in public education. Efforts to improve SIMCE scores 
are of little relevance when parents’ choices are based on another set of consumer values (Weinstein et 
al., 2012) and the reputation of public education will not be change by individual principals. As 
pointed out by Linkow et al. (2011), marketing fails to address the promise of choice, that is, the 
provision of a stronger educational program. Moreover, time spent on promotional activities prevent 
principals from giving attention to instructional matters that could directly impact students’ learning.  
Principals reported much less autonomy than promised by the law. Rather than autonomy they 
expressed abandonment by their municipality’s Department of Education. It seems that autonomy, in 
these public schools, is autonomy to develop the kind of entrepreneurship needed to beat other 
schools at obtaining sponsorships and partnerships from business and other organizations. Creating 
conditions to compete with other public schools for monies from the private sector perpetuates the 
idea that success reflects personal merits. Saving one school involves sinking another one within the 
municipality when the number of families “choosing” public schools is low. Competition has 
additional consequences as it undermines the possibilities for system-wide school improvement.  
A clear consequence of this environment of targets and threats is an erosion of the 
relationships of trust between practitioners/clients, practitioner and employers, and among 
practitioners that in the past has characterized professionalism (Biesta, 2004; Evetts, 2011). Social 
relations based on measurements, inspections and extrinsic incentives have come to replace trust, thus 
moving schools away from what the literature reiterates about leading for improvement (Leithwood, 
Day, Sammons, Harris, & Hopkins, 2006; Tan, 2012). Rather than spending time promoting events to 
make their “new” schools visible (advertisement), principals need to spend time working with the 
school community to develop a shared vision (as opposed to image). Principals need to spend time 
working collaboratively with teachers, parents and peer schools to support students, teachers, and 
organizational learning (Day et al., 2010). Time spent on marketing is time not spent on what matters 
for improving the education public schools offer, that is, building internal capacity for research, 
reflection, and innovation (Hargreaves & Shirley, 2012).  
Our findings exemplify some of the problems of the “new professionalism” fashioned by 
educational laws seeking to steer the work of school leaders in the competitive school marketplace. To 
avoid proposing individual solutions to address structural problems, the agency of public school 
principals to change this model should not be overstated. From the safety of the academy, it is 
irresponsible for us to suggest that principals jeopardize their jobs by engaging in active resistance or 
by ignoring performance targets.  The various educational policies controlling principals’ work offer 
enough disjuncture to allow spaces for agency and negotiating priorities. For example, fulfilling the 
SEP Law requirements can offer principals leverage to spend more time focusing on instructional 
matters. School principals, and the professional development programs that prepare them, need to 
help them learn to work from an ethic of solidarity, developing and implementing strategies for 
sharing resources among schools. For example, they could jointly hire a bus to take children to and 
from school or seek partnerships with business that benefit all schools within the municipality.  
In professional development and principal preparation programs, principals can learn how to 
develop and implement democratic forms of accountability to make possible social relationships that 
resist the distrust promoted by the marketization of education. As argued by Ryan (2005), the problem 
is not accountability per se. These findings highlight why questions such as “for what” and to “whom” 
should principals be accountable, need to be explore in principal preparation programs and policy 
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development. On a similar point, Anderson (2011) has argued that school leaders and teachers need to 
be responsible for advancing a human rights agenda, and education as a social right.  
One interesting contradiction emerges from the fact that the market logic has displaced 
students as the “clients” of the “new professionals”, replacing them with parents as consumers. 
Chilean students attending public institutions have not entered into this economic relation with their 
school or the state. Instead, they have mobilized extensively to hold the government directly 
responsible for the erosion of public education. The high school and university student movements of 
2006 and 2011 have catalyzed changes in educational policies but not in the model.  
During her candidacy for Chile`s presidency in 2013, Michelle Bachelet ran on a platform 
promising to dismantle key features of the market model for the provision of educational services. 
During her first year she has sent a number of bills to the legislature seeking, among other things, to 
stop parents’ co-payment in addition to state subsidy, to turn all private subsidized schools into non-
profit corporations, and to stop all state-financed schools from selecting students. It is too soon to tell 
if the laws that have been passed will make a difference to strengthen public education or will increase 
competition between public and private schools. 
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